To Educate or Not to Educate: The Plight of Undocumented Alien Children in Texas by Heberton, Craig, IV
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 1 
January 1982 
To Educate or Not to Educate: The Plight of Undocumented Alien 
Children in Texas 
Craig Heberton IV 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Craig Heberton IV, To Educate or Not to Educate: The Plight of Undocumented Alien Children in Texas, 60 
WASH. U. L. Q. 119 (1982). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
TO EDUCATE OR NOT TO EDUCATE: THE
PLIGHT OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN
CHILDREN IN TEXAS
The burgeoning growth of illegal migration into the United States
over the last two decades' has encouraged the search for alternative
means2 to regulate the flow of undocumented aliens3 into this country.
I. The number of apprehended deportable aliens increased twenty-fold from 1967 to 1978.
UNITED STATES INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, STAFF REPORT, DEPART-
MENTS OF JUSTICE, LABOR AND STATE 30 (1979) [hereinafter cited as INTERAGENCY REPORT]. In
1977, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended 1,033,427 deportable aliens.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POL-
IcY: 1952-1979, at 71 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIARY REPORT OF 19791. See
generally Nafziger, 4 Policy Framework/or Regulating the Flow of Undocumented Mexican Aliens
into the United States, 56 ORE. L. REV. 63, 97 (1977); Salinas & Torres, The UndocumentedMexi-
can ,4lien: A Legal, Social and Economic Ana lsis, 13 Hous. L. REV. 863, 876-81 (1976).
2. Existing law and enforcement practices sufficiently controlled earlier periods of substan-
tial illegal migration following the First and Second World Wars and the Korean War. Histori-
cally, economic factors in both the United States and Mexico encouraged the periods of high legal
and illegal migration. Beginning in 1971, Congress began to search for new solutions to the illegal
migration problem, concluding that the existent laws were relatively ineffectual. See INTER-
AGENCY REPORT, supra note I, at 396-401; JUDICIARY REPORT OF 1979, supra note 1, at 71-76. In
1976 Congress passed a law limiting each country to a 20,000 immigrants per year entry quota
based upon a preference system favoring family reunification and skilled workers. Act of Oct. 20,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703. Prior to the Act, only a 120,000 immigrant visa ceiling for
all countries in the western hemisphere limited Mexican immigration. JUDICIARY REPORT OF
1979, supra note 1, at 64, 69. In 1977 the Judiciary Committee failed to report out a bill presented
by Rep. Rodino, H.R. 9531, 95th Cong., 1st Sess, 123 CONG. REC. 33,493 (1977), that would have
imposed fines up to $1000 per violation on civil employers for hiring undocumented aliens and
granted amnesty residence to those persons entering the country unlawfully before January 1,
1970. Bernsen, Undocumented Aliens: Current Legislative Proposals, in IN DEFENSE OF THE
ALIEN 133-37 (1979). See also UNITED STATES SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REF-
UGEE POLICY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT TO CONGRESS (Comm. Print 1980).
The Reagan Administration has drafted a number of proposals based on a bipartisan select
committee study, which former President Carter initially commissioned iT 1977. Both the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy and the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law began hearings on proposals for a new
national immigration policy in September 1981. According to Attorney General William French
Smith, the Administration seeks to stem the tide of undocumented aliens by utilizing civil fines of
$500 to $1,000 per offense and injunctions against employers knowingly hiring undocumented
aliens. The Administration, however, proposes granting "renewable term temporary residen[cy]"
and eventual permanent resident status for undocumented aliens residing in this country before
January 1, 1980. See September Hearings Set by House, Senate Panels on U.S. Immigration Policy,
39 CONG. Q. 1445 (1981) [hereinafter cited as September Hearings]. See also SELECT COMMISSION
ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, FINAL REPORT ON U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY & THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]; SELECT
COMMISSION IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY & THE NATIONAL
INTEREST (1981) (Supp. to FINAL REPORT, supra) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
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Currently, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates
that from 3.5 to 6 million undocumented aliens are present within our
nation at any one time.
The massive influx of undocumented Mexican aliens5 raises a con-
flict of interest in American society. On the one hand, accommodation
of unskilled farm labor needs in the Southwest, a substantial benefit to
the economy, tacitly encourages illegal immigration. On the other
3. This Note uses the term "undocumented alien" throughout rather than the better-known
expression "illegal alien." The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 does not define the latter
term. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976). Undocumented aliens include aliens who violate the federal immi-
gration laws by entering the country with fraudulent documents or without inspection, by entering
lawfully but overstaying the allotted visa period, or by breaching the terms of their lawful entry
visa. See INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 1, at iii; H.R. Doc. No. 202, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). See also STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
4. Reliable information concerning the number and characteristics of undocumented aliens
is in woefully short supply. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Tex. 1978), fTd, 628 F.2d
448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob.jurb, noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981); FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 36.
As of 1979, the INS Commissioner estimated that the undocumented population ranged from 3 to
6 million because of its general seasonal nature. INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 1, at 30. In
February 1981 the President's Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy concluded
that the figure fluctuated between 3.5 and 6 million. Some commentators have referred to more
substantial federal estimates. See generally Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public
Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63 (1977) (4 to 12 million range); Kane & Mufioz,
Undocumented Aliens and the Constitutiom Limitations on State Action Denying Undocumented
ChildrenAccess to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 461,461 n.l (1978) (6 to 10 million
range). See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 899 n.l (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
('It]he Court today recognizes that as many as 12 million illegal aliens are now present in this
country").
The most recent estimate, based on a report made by the Census Bureau, is that between 3.5
and 6 million undocumented aliens are in this country. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 36, 73.
5. This Note will focus on undocumented Mexican aliens because they constitute the major-
ity ofundocumented aliens, particularly in Texas. See INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note I, at 30.
See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 n.5 (1975) (92% of the deportable
aliens arrested in 1974 were Mexicans). Of the undocumented aliens within the United States,
officials estimate that slightly less than one-half are Mexican nationals. See FINAL REPORT, supra
note 2, at 36.
6. The Fifth Circuit recognized that "[illiegal aliens can generally be hired to work for sub-
standard wages under substandard conditions, which results in significant savings to their employ-
ers ... [and which may be] passed on to consumers ... ." Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 451 n.7
(5th Cir. 1980),prob. jurs noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981). The main incentive behind illegal migra-
tion from Mexico is employment opportunities. Most undocumented aliens (as many as 90%) are
young adult males who work in the United States part of the year and then return to their families
in Mexico. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 n. 11, 585 n.22 (E.D. Tex. 1978), qfl'd, 628 F.2d
448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.jiurl noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has stressed that
"Texas has declined to enact the measure most likely to result in lessening the incentive to illegally
enter the United States." 628 F.2d at 461. For other material contending that exploited undocu-
mented labor contributes overall to the American economy, see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891,900-04 app. (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring); Tax. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM'N ON CIV.
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hand, the sheer number of undocumented Mexicans in contiguous
states raises complex issues.7 Displacement of legal residents from jobs
during a time of high unemployment,' defeat of labor and workplace
reform,9 and unfair depletion of local resources and government bene-
fits' 0 are major concerns.
RIGHTS, A SURVEY OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION IN Two TEXAS BORDER AREAS 39
(1978), noted in 16 Hous. L. REv. 667, 691 n.175 (1979). See generally A STUDY OF THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, SAN DIEGO COUNTY (1977),
noted in Kane & Muftoz, supra note 4, at 464 n.16. See also Cooper, Labor Law: Undocumented
Alien Employees, Bargaining Orders, Exhaustion and Other 7th Circuit Cases, 56 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 303, 313 (1980); Note, Right of Undocumented Children to Attend Public Schools in Texas, 4
CHICANO L. REV. 61, 66 (1977).
7. It is estimated that as many as 675,000 undocumented aliens, predominantly from Mex-
ico, are present in Texas. See Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d 432, 439 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981).
8. Both courts and commentators recognize the negative impact of undocumented laborers
on the employment opportunities available to legal aliens and citizens of similar socioeconomic
stature. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976); Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 551 n.7
(5th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 n.22 (E.D. Tex. 1978); INTERAGENCY REPORT,
supra note 1, at 21; SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93RD CONG., 1ST SESS.,
ILLEGAL ALIENS: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND 12 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as JU-
DICIARY REPORT OF 1977]; Nafziger, .4 Policy Frameworkfor Regulating the Flow of Undocu-
mentedMexican Aliens into the United States, 2 1. & N.L. REV. 177, 183-86 (1978). See also Catz,
Regulating the Employment of llegal Aliens: De Canas and Section 2805, 17 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 751 (1977); Reubens, Aliens, Jobs and Immigration Policy, 3 I. & N.L. REV. 649 (1979-80);
Rodino, The Impact of Immigration on the American Labor Market, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 245
(1974).
Despite the statistics indicating that undocumented aliens cause job displacement, some
authorities contend that they represent an additiotial rather than substitute labor source. Undocu-
mented aliens take many "undesirable" jobs and may induce some industries to remain in the
United States rather than move abroad. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 39-40.
9. The Supreme Court has recognized that "acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substan-
dard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working
conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal aliens under such
conditions can diminish the effectiveness of labor unions." De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,356-57
(1976).
According to the executive branch, "[i]t is calculated that an illegal worker population in the
United States of roughly 4 million would cause the wages of competing low-skill workers to de-
cine by approximately 15 percent." INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 1, at 22. See also FINAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 40-41.
10. Existing studies tend to refute this concern. Undocumented aliens apparently shy away
from public assistance because they are afraid to risk exposure of their identities to authorities and
because there is no welfare tradition in Mexico. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Tex.
1978), aft'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981). Further, "[tlhe
statistical evidence is threadbare .... Much of the problem, again, seems to involve projected
anxieties. In general, the presence of [undocumented] aliens 'is always perceived as a threat by
local communities until it is discovered that immigrants... put a high premium on self-help and
self-sufficiency.'" Nafziger, supra note 8, at 188-89.
According to the Select Commission's Final Report, 70% of undocumented aliens pay taxes.
Washington University Open Scholarship
122 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:119
Congress' unwillingness to control effectively the flow of undocu-
mented Mexican aliens across the 889 mile Texas-Mexico border en-
courages states to address "a pressing national problem"'" in a
piecemeal fashion.' 2 In 1975 the Texas legislature concluded that the
presence of undocumented alien children in state public schools de-
tracts from the quality of public education for legal resident children,
and thus enacted a law denying undocumented alien children free pub-
lic education.'"
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 38. Governor Babbit of Arizona believes "that through work
[undocumented aliens] contribute much and require little from the host society." STAFF REPORT,
supra note 2, at 58.
11. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327, 1331 (Pow-
ell, Circuit Justice, 1980) (recognizing that, given the rising number of unlawful entrants, the ille-
gal migration problem is of national scope). See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 35-36. The
undocumented aliens also consist of large numbers from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Haiti, South America, and Asia, residing in all parts of this country. Id.
12. Due to Congress' inability to pass legislation restricting employment of undocumented
alien workers, some states passed laws designed to lessen the impact of illegal migration. See note
2 supra. The California statute states that "[n]o employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is
not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse
effect on lawful resident workers." CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976). See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 31-51k (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4409 (Supp. 1980). See generaly 2 A. MUTHARIKA,
THE ALIEN IN AMERICAN LAW 76-87 (1981).
Other than Texas, however, no state law presently denies undocumented alien children a free
public education. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327,
1328 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980). The district court in In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation,
501 F. Supp. 544, 578-79 & n.88 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob. jfris noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981), found
that free public education is not a "significant attraction" for undocumented aliens. The court
recognized various studies indicating that of the approximately 12% of undocumented Mexican
nationals who permanently reside in the United States, between 21% and 29% have school-age
children. Out of the entire undocumented population in our country, an estimated 3.7% of the
undocumented aliens have children in school. Id. at 578 n.83. Cf. Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d 432,
437 & n.7 (5th Cir. 198 1) (Reavely, J., concurring) (citing the Dallas Independent School District's
projection that 2,000 to 5,000 undocumented aliens would enroll in the district in addition to the
120,000 student total enrollment).
13. See TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1980). No legislative history
accompanies § 21.031. The bill's sponsor, State Representative Ruben Torres, introduced a reso-
lution into the Texas House of Representatives stating, "[als the number of illegal aliens in Texas
continues to increase, many financially troubled districts find it difficult to provide educational
services for alien children without adversely affecting the overall quality of such services." Note,
supra note 6, at 62 n.ll. In a letter dated March 14, 1975, Rep. Torres indicated to Rep. Massey
that he primarily intended the law to "eliminate the admission of illegal aliens to public school
districts in Texas." Kane & Mufioz, supra note 4, at 463 n.13.
A 1977 amendment to § 21.031(d) implies an intent to decrease illegal migration. The subsec-
tion's sponsor stated that § 21.03 1(d) would serve "to make it more difficult for kids to be brought
in from Mexico to attend schools in the United States." In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501
F. Supp. 544, 578 n.84 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). The Allen
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On the basis of the Final Report of the Select Commission on Immi-
gration and Refugee Policy, the Reagan Administration presently ad-
vocates the passage of a federal law that would extend amnesty to
many undocumented aliens. 4 Further, President Reagan supports en-
actment of a federal law that would penalize employers who hire those
aliens retaining their undocumented status under the current propo-
sal. 5 Additional federal legislation, however, is necessary to alleviate
the strain that undocumented immigration places on educational sys-
tems in border states and other areas across the country. 16
Congress already has responded to problems created by the massive
influx of refugees into this country in the Refugee Education Assistance
Act of 1980.1 Under this Act, Congress has appropriated federal funds
to provide general assistance to local education agencies for the educa-
tion of Cuban and Haitian refugee children and to provide special im-
pact aid for the education of Cuban, Haitian, and Indochinese refugee
children. Congress should enact similar legislation to alleviate the im-
pact of undocumented aliens on various educational systems. Without
such legislation many school systems may be hard pressed to meet the
educational needs of the undocumented alien children of today who,
especially in light of the current amnesty proposals, may become the
Children court concluded, "[i]t is not unlikely that similar concerns prevailed in 1975." Id. In
regard to the California employer law, see note 12 supra, the court noted that "[ilf [Texas] was
genuinely interested in removing inducements for illegal immigration or in preserving public
funds dedicated to education, a law sanctioning employers for hiring undocumented persons
would do very nicely. Little support exists for such a measure." Id. at 544 n.88. See generally
Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d at 434-41 (Reavley, J., concurring).
14. See September Hearings, supra note 2. The Final Report of the Select Commission la-
ments that the worst element of the disregard for immigration laws may well be that it breeds
disregard for other American laws. Society bears a heavy cost when an undocumented alien is
afraid to testify to witnessing a crime or to report an illness that may endanger the public. See
FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 41-42,73. Deportation of undocumented aliens would prove to be
costly, largely ineffective, injurious to American civil liberties, and subject to court challenge.
Legalization would encourage open contributions to society by undocumented aliens, elimination
of the depression of American labor standards and wages, targeting of Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service resources to stopping new influxes of undocumented aliens, and the accumulation
of reliable data on undocumented aliens necessary to deter migration at its source. Id. at 73-74;
STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 63-64, 76.
15. See note 2 supra.
16. See note 11 supra. The strain placed by undocumented aliens upon educational re-
sources is not unique to Texas or the border states. On October 17, 1974, the General Superinten-
dent of the Chicago Public Schools implemented a tuition charge for undocumented children.
Thereafter, with litigation pending, the Superintendent reversed the tuition policy. See Limon v.
Hannon, No. 77-3007 (N.D. Ill. Jan., 3, 1979) (dismissed as moot).
17. Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-422, 94 Stat. 1799.
Number 1]
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legal residents of tomorrow.18
This Note addresses the constitutional issues raised by the Texas de-
cision to deny undocumented alien school children a free public educa-
tion and suggests a method of analysis. 9 The analysis focuses on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and utilizes both
the classification and fundamental right concepts. The primary issues
are first, whether undocumented aliens enjoy equal protection of the
laws; second, whether absolute denial of education violates a funda-
mental right; third, whether undocumented aliens constitute a suspect
class; fourth, whether section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code
would fail under "middle tier" analysis; and finally, whether federal
immigration law preempts state legislation that denies undocumented
aliens an education.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 1975 the Texas Legislature amended section 21.031 of the
Texas Education Code, which stated that "[e]very child20 in this state
...shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in
which he resides.' The amendment specifies that only resident
18. See notes 2 & 14 supra.
19. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. jurl.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
Undocumented children excluded from public schools may also challenge the Texas statute, see
note 21 infra, on the ground that it violates the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
(1976). For cases holding that noncitizens can assert claims under these sections, see Post-trial
Brief for Plaintiff at 15-17, In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex.
1980),prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). [hereinafter cited as Post-trial Brief for Plaintiff].
See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that denial of bilingual education to Chi-
nese-speaking children constituted a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
20. Acting upon the request of the Texas Commissioner of Education, the Attorney General
of Texas issued an opinion in April 1975 that concluded that § 21.031 of the Texas Education
Code entitled children residing illegally, as well as legally, within the state to a free public school
education. The opinion also stated:
Whether the Legislature itself may establish an exception for illegal aliens has not been
decided by the higher courts. While we recognize that the United States Supreme Court
could sustain an exercise of legislative power, the existing case law indicates that the
rights of illegal aliens are protected by 42 U.S.C.A. [§ 1981] and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.
Op. Att'y Gen. H-586, at 3 (1975), quotedin Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 572 n.3 (E.D. Tex.
1978).
21. Prior to the 1975 Amendment, § 21.031 provided that
(a) .411children without regard to color over the age of six years and under the age of 18
years... shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that
year.
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citizen children or legal alien children between the ages of 5 and 21 are
entitled to a free public school education.22 The amended version of
section 21.031 allows each school district an independent choice be-
tween three alternatives. First, a school district can choose to exclude
undocumented alien children.23 Second, districts may condition at-
tendance upon payment of a tuition fee.24 Third, a district can con-
(b) Ever' child in this state over the age of six years and not over the age of 21 years
.. shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he
resides ....
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into
the public free schools of the districtfree of tuition allpersons over six and not over
21 years of age. . . if such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful
control resides within the school district.
TEXAS EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon 1972) (emphasis added).
The Texas Education Agency (TEA) failed to conduct any studies prior to the amendment of
§ 21.031 to assess the impact of permitting undocumented school children to remain in public
schools. Furthermore, the TEA does not presently possess any empirical data concerning the
number of children excluded as a result of implementation of§ 21.031. Post-trial Brief for Plain-
tiff, supra note 19, at 49.
22. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1980) presently provides:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who
are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of
September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available
School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this State who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted
alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on the
first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be permitted to
attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his
parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he
applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into
the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either citi-
zens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not
over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his
parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.
Id (emphasis added).
23. According to a 1980 study, 45.8% of surveyed Texas school districts with enrollments of
10,000 or more did not admit undocumented alien children even on a tuition basis. Post-trial
Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 19, at 23-24.
24. Texas Education Agency administrator Edward Randall acknowledges that, "[e]ach
[school] district can have its own policy of the type of document required of immigrant children to
implement § 21.031." Thus the statute can be interpreted to include children who are not deport-
able, see note 80 infra, under federal law. Post-trial Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 19, at 89.
The Tyler Independent School District charged undocumented students $1,000 per year before
the court enjoined the tuition system. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 571 (E.D. Tex. 1978), at'd,
628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.jurisnoted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981). In 1976 the Houston schools
charged $90 per month, and the Austin tuition fee ranged between $1,300 and $1,728. See Note,
ipra note 6, at 62.
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tinue to admit undocumented children on a tuition-free basis.25 This
last alternative, however, is economically impractical because the state
will not supplement the local costs of educating undocumented chil-
dren.26 Thus, a benevolent district's per-pupil state financing is neces-
sarily diluted to the detriment of other students. Presently, a statewide
injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas prohibits the administration of section 21.03 1.27
Section 21.031 successfully withstood a constitutional challenge in a
1977 state court action against the Houston Independent School Dis-
trict. The Court of Civil Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial Dis-
trict of Texas held, in Hernandez v. Houston Independent School
District,28 that section 21.031 violated neither the equal protection
clause nor the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.29 On
appeal, the Texas Supreme Court summarily rejected the application
for a writ of error.3°
In 1978 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas entertained an action challenging the application of section
21.031 in the Tyler Independent School District (Tyler ISD).31 The
district court, in Doe v. Plyler,32 permanently enjoined enforcement of
the statute and tuition policy, but only within the Tyler ISD.33 The
25. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.jurls.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
26. Id. at 555 & n.17 (schools that freely admit undocumented children are penalized because
they receive less per-pupil state financing than districts that choose to exclude such children; con-
sequently, most schools will not freely admit such children). See TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2,
§ 21.031(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980). But see 1 A. MuTHAmKA, supra note 12, at 41 (undocumented
children presently attend school free of charge in the Odessa and Tyler Independent School
Districts).
27. Inre Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob. PurIs.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
28. 558 S.W.2d 121 (rex. Civ. App. 1977).
29. Id. at 125.
30. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (the court rejected the applica-
tion for writ without opinion).
31. Id. at 571. Parents brought the suit on behalf of a group of undocumented children,
challenging the Tyler tuition policy and constitutionality of the statute. The State of Texas inter-
vened as a party defendant and the district court ordered transformation of the suit into a class
action.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 593. The district conditioned enrollment of undocumented alien children upon a
yearly tuition fee of $1,000. None of the plaintiffs could afford the tuition, although the court
observed that two undocumented children attended schools within the district on a tuition basis.
Id. at 575. In July 1977 the Tyler School Board implemented § 21.031 by promulgating the policy
that:
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court determined that section 21.031 violated the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the "rational
relation" test.34 The decision further held that federal law preempted
the statute under the supremacy clause.35 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit subsequently affirmed the trial court's issuance of injunc-
tive relief within the Tyler ISD on equal protection grounds,36 but re-
versed the district court's finding of preemption.37
In 1979 the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated
four complaints38 filed against three Texas school districts in the South-
ern District of Texas.39 The panel remanded similar suits arising out of
the Northern40 and Western Districts4l to their original districts, hold-
ing them in abeyance pending resolution of the Southern District litiga-
tion.42 The district court resolved the consolidated class action
challenge to section 21.031 in In re Alien Children Education Litiga-
lion,43 concluding that the statute violated the equal protection
clause.' Whereas the Plyler opinions hinged upon a determination
that the state enactment was not rationally related to any of the legiti-
Illegal alien children may enroll and attend schools in the Tyler Independent School
District by payment of the full tuition fee.
A legally admitted alien is one who has documentation that he or she is legally in the
United States, or a person who is in the process of securing documentation from the
[Immigration and Naturalization Service] ....
Id. at 572.
34. Id. at 593.
35. Id. at 592.
36. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1980).
37. Id. at 452-54.
38. Martinez v. Reagan, No. H-78-1797 (S.D. Tex., filed Sept. 18, 1978) (Houston ISD). The
following actions concerned nondeportable undocumented aliens: Garza v. Reagan, No. H-78-
2132 (S.D. Tex., filed Nov. 6, 1978) (Houston ISD); Cardena v. Meyer, No. H-78-1862 (S.D. Tex.,
filed Sept. 27, 1978) (Pasadena ISD); Mendoza v. Clark, No. H-78-1831 (S.D. Tex., fied Sept. 22,
1978) (Goose Creek Consolidated ISD).
39. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 482 F.Supp. 326, 330 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
40. Boe v. Wright, No. 3-79-0440-D (N.D. Tex., Sept. 11, 1980), af d, 648 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
1981).
41. Roe v. Holm, No. MO-79-CA-49 (W.D. Tex., fied June 26, 1979); Coe v. Holm, No.
MO-79-CA-54 (W.D. Tex., fied July 5, 1979).
42. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 482 F. Supp. 326, 330 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
43. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). According to
the court, the class consisted of 120,000 undocumented children across the state of Texas, none of
whom was the subject of a deportation. Further, many of the children are not deportable and will
permanently reside in this country. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 74-75.
44. 501 F. Supp. at 564, 597.
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mate goals asserted by the state,45 the Alien Children court subjected
section 21.031 to strict judicial scrutiny.46 The court declared that the
Texas statute impaired a previously unrecognized fundamental right of
access to existent public education under the United States
Constitution.47
The Court of Appeals stayed, without opinion, the statewide injunc-
tion in Alien Children .48 Thereafter, Justice Powell, sitting as Circuit
Justice, overturned the stay,4 9 holding that "the balance of harm [cre-
ated by section 21.031] weigh[ed] heavily upon the children.25 0  Al-
though Justice Powell did not address the substantive issues of the case,
he stated that it is "not unreasonable" to speculate that five members of
the Supreme Court might agree with the decision the district court
reached in Alien Children.5'
45. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 593
(E.D. Tex. 1978).
46. 501 F. Supp. at 564.
47. Id. at 564, 597. The Supreme Court has never decided whether educational opportunity
is a fundamental right. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 448 U.S.
1327, 1329 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980). Some lower courts, however, have held that the federal
Constitution guarantees a certain minimum level of education. See Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F.
Supp. 946, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1974). See
generally Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate Educationfor Learning Disabled Children,
12 VAL. U.L. REv. 253 (1978). See also note 91 infra.
48. See Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327, 1328
(Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980).
49. Id. at 1334.
50. Id. Justice Powell determined that the "irreparable harm" suffered by the undocumented
children from denial of any education over the course of five years easily outweighed the addi-
tional burdens that the injunction would place upon the school districts. Powell nevertheless qual-
ified his order by concluding:
If the [individual] district can demonstrate because of the number of undocumented
alien children within its jurisdiction or because of exceptionally limited resources, the
operation of the injunction would severely hamper the provision of education to al its
students during the coming year the granting of a stay would be justified.
Id. Yet, Justice Powell noted that the affadavits indicated that the injunction might severely strain
only the Houston ISD and that the district court had stated that it would stay its injunction if
individual school districts could demonstrate that compliance would present an "exceptional difli-
culty." Id. at 1334 n.4.
51. Id. at 1332. Justice Powell further explained:
This is not to suggest that I have reached any decision on the merits of this case or that I
think it more probable than not that we will agree with the District Court. Rather, it
recognizes that the Court's decision is reasoned, that it presents novel and important
issues, and is supported by considerations that may be persuasive to the Court of Ap-
peals, or to this Court. Further, it may be possible to accept the District Court's decision
without fully embracing the full sweep of its analysis.
Id. This language is particularly interesting in light of the fact that Justice Powell authored the
majority opinion in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which
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Subsequently, in Boe v. Wright,52 the Fifth Circuit held that the Dal-
las Independent School District violated the equal protection clause by
prohibiting undocumented children access to a public education.5 3 The
court summarily concluded that its holding in Doe v. Ply/er con-
trolled. 4 Circuit Judge Reavely concurred on the basis of the Doe v.
P vler holding. Judge Reavely, however, stated that the state's interest
in decreasing educational costs to avoid diminution of the quality of
education was a rational justification for excluding undocumented
aliens from free public education. 5
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The due process clause56 of the fourteenth amendment protects un-
documented aliens.5" The United States Supreme Court, however, has
never addressed the question whether equal protection of the laws58
held that a relative deprivation of education claim did not invoke strict scrutiny of the classifica-
tions. Powell left open the question whether an absolute deprivation of education, such as a tui-
tion policy, might require heightened judicial scrutiny.
52. 648 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 433 & n.6.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 434-41 (Reavely, J., concurring).
56. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, which reads in pertinent part, "nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
57. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (dictum), recognized that the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause extends to undocumented aliens:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The
Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these
persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ....
Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful. . . is entitled to that constitutional
protection.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be
expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairnesss"); Kwong Hal
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597-98 n.6 (1953) (quoting The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903)) (executive officers cannot arbitrarily take into custody and deport one
"who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction... al-
though alleged to be illegally here"); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950)
("this Court long ago held that an antecedent deportation statute must provide a hearing. . . for
aliens ... who had been here some time even if illegally"). See also Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Williams v. Williams, 328 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (D.V.I. 1971);
Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. 111. 1936).
58. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.firo noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981);
In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. i.r noted,
101 S. CL 3078 (1981). Seealso Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d 432,434 n.l (5th Cir. 1981) (Reavely, 3.,
concurring).
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under the fourteenth amendment applies to undocumented aliens.59
The plain meaning of the equal protection clause dictates the conclu-
sion that undocumented children are beneficiaries of its coverage be-
cause undocumented children are clearly "persons" residing within the
jurisdiction of the state.60 Furthermore, the legislative history of the
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment reads in pertinent part, "nor [shall any
state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
60. First, the structure of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment warrants the conclusion that un-
documented aliens enjoy equal protection of the laws. The privileges and immunities clause em-
braces only "citizens." The Supreme Court has determined that the "any person" language of the
due process clause extends to undocumented as well as documented aliens. See note 57 s7pra.
Certainly the narrower language of the equal protection clause, "any person within its jurisdic-
tion," must apply to undocumented aliens because they are persons residing in the state of Texas.
Neither surreptitious means of entry nor violation of federal law after a legal entry detract from
the fact that undocumented aliens are "within the jurisdiction" and subject to the laws of our
country. In 1872 the Supreme Court noted that "[a]ll strangers [within this country] are under the
protection of the sovereign while they are within his territories, and owe a temporary allegiance in
return for that protection." Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872) (quoting
R. WILDMAN, INSTITUTES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (1850)). See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448,
454 (5th Cir. 1980) ("aliens illegally within this country are clearly persons within the jurisdiction
of the state in which they reside ... under the simple language of the Fourteenth Amendment");
Castillo-Felix v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 601 F.2d 459, 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1979) (un-
documented petitioner can assert equal protection rights); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106,
110 (5th Cir. 1979) ("once aliens have become subject to liability under United States law, they
also have the right to benefit from its protection"); Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023, 1025 (2nd Cir.
1975) (dictum) ("the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment apply to
aliens within the United States and even to aliens whose presence here is illegal"); In re Alien
Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 568 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("undocumented aliens. . . are
'persons within the jurisdiction' of the state"), prob. fizris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981); United
States v. Otherson, 480 F. Supp. 1369, 1371 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (undocumented aliens are protected
by 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976), which is based upon the equal protection clause); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F.
Supp. 569, 579 (E.D. Tex. 1978) ("[n]either the language nor the logic of the fourteenth amend-
ment supports the proposition that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws does not extend toillegal aliens"), aj'd, 628 F.2d 448(5th Cir. 1980),prob.siur noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981). But see
Burrafato v. United States Dep't of State, 523 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1975) (illegal alien does not
have standing to sue for denial of a visa), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976); Alonso v. California,
50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 248, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540 (1975) (illegal alien has no constitutional right to
equal opportunity of employment), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976).
Second, the Supreme Court has interpreted the fourteenth amendment to mean exactly what it
states:
The Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to the protection of citizens. . . . [The due
process and equal protection] provisions are universal in their application, to allpersons
within the territorial jurisdiction without regard to differences of race, of color, or national-
ity; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
Applying this reasoning to the 5th and 6th Amendments, it must be concluded that all
persons within the territory of the U.S. are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those
amendments ....
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (emphasis added).
Third, the due process clause is a constitutional guarantee equally as basic as the equal protec-
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amendment supports the conclusion that violation of the Immigration





A. Fundamental Right Analysis6
2
If a state statutory classification violates a right the federal Constitu-
tion assures, the right is "fundamental," and the appropriate level of
tion clause. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448,456 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980),prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044
(1981). The extensiveness of the equal protection clause differs, however, when the class is statuto-
rily created by the federal government:
Although both amendments require the same analysis. . . the two protections are not
always co-extensive. Not only does the language of the two Amendments differ, but
more importantly, there may be overriding national interests which justify selective fed-
eral legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State. On the other hand,
when a federal rule is applicable to a limited territory. . . and when there is no special
national interest involved, the Due Process Clause has been construed as having the
same significance as the Equal Protection Clause.
Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976). This Note deals only with state classifica-
tions. The Alien Children court, in response to the contention that due process embracement of
undocumented aliens does not infer similar equal protection coverage, stated that:
It is illogical to argue that the rights protected by the Due Process Clause should not
determine which persons are protected by the equal protection clause. Analysis which
focuses on the rights embraced by the two provisions sorely misapprehends the issue
whether undocumented aliens are protected by the equal protection clause.
In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. at 568 n.46. See also 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 549,
562-63 (1979).
Finally, the lack of authority to support the proposition that undocumented aliens enjoy equal
protection can be attributed primarily to the fear of exposure to deportation risked by asserting
legal rights.
61. A sponsor of the fourteenth amendment stated:
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disables a State from depriving
not merely a citizen but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of
the State ....
[I]t will, if adopted by the States, forever disable everyone of them from passing laws
trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the
United States, and to all persons who may happen to be within its jurisdiction.
71 CONG. GLOBE 2755 (May 23, 1866). Thus a provision requiring nonresident children to pay a
school tuition is constitutional because such persons do not reside "within its jurisdiction."
DeLeon v. Harlingen Consol. Independent School Dist., 522 S.W.2d 922, 925 (rex. Civ. App.
1977). Furthermore, equal protection coverage accorded to undocumented aliens residing within
Texas obviously does not demand that Texas "provide a tuition-free education to foreign children
living abroad" as contended in Hernandez v. Houston Independent School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121,
124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
62. The federal courts have not addressed the potential fourteenth amendment substantive
due process claim within this issue. Due process analysis is applied to protect "fundamental"
constitutional liberties. As a result of the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), courts
are hesitant to analyze an issue under substantive due process when equal protection grounds are
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judicial inquiry is strict scrutiny.63 The strict scrutiny test requires a
state to demonstrate that the discriminatory classification is necessary
to effectuate a compelling governmental interest.64 Further, the Consti-
tution need not explicitly enumerate a right in order to qualify it as
fundamental.65 The Constitution also protects implied fundamental in-
terests that are necessary to uphold explicitly enumerated fundamental
rights.66 The Supreme Court has held that a relative deprivation of
educational opportunity does not violate a fundamental right.67 The
Court, however, has not addressed whether total denial of access to an
ongoing primary or secondary school system is constitutionally
permissible.68
available. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938-39, 946 (10th
ed. 1980). See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
63. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
64. The equal protection clause "measurefs] the validity of classifications created by state
laws." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Legislatures must draft classifications fairly and treat similarly-situated people alike.
When strict scrutiny is triggered by a suspect class or impingement upon a fundamental interest,
the state has the burden of showing that the statute is precisely tailored to further a compelling
interest. Further, the state must show that it has adopted the least drastic alternative. See In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). Sce
generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term--Foreword: In Search of Eroling Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
65. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecpficd
Rights: On Protecting Fundamental and Not-So Fundamental 'Rights" or "Interests" Through a
Flexible Conception of EqualFrotection, 1977 DUKE L.J. 143. Fundamental rights implied within
the Constitution include the right to receive information, see, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969); the right of association, see, eg., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); the right to interstate travel, see, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); the right to vote in state elections, see,
eg., Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553 (1964); the right to privacy and marital relations,
see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right of access to
criminal trials, see, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); the right of
access to the criminal appeals system, see, eg., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
66. See note 65 supra.
67. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
68. See notes 91-99 & 101-02 infra and accompanying text.
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1. Absolute Deprivation and Relative Deprivation of Educational
Opportunity Concerns in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez
Numerous Supreme Court decisions acknowledge the immeasurable
importance of educating all individuals in our society.69 In the context
of school desegration, in Brown v. Board of Education,70 the Court em-
phasized the relationship between achievement and educational oppor-
tunities, and stressed the need to distribute education rights to everyone
equally.71 Nine years ago, however, the Supreme Court, in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodguez,72 determined that individuals
do not enjoy a fundamental right of equal educational opportunity
under the Constitution.
The Rodriguez claimants asserted that the Texas public school ex-
penditure scheme severely deprived children of educational benefits in
the poorer school districts.73 The scheme involved state contributions
to individual school districts based upon the assessable value of private
property within the district.74 Property-rich districts received consider-
ably greater state aid than property-poor districts.75  Thus, the system
produced substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures.
The Rodriuez opinion concluded that the relative deprivation of edu-
cational benefits suffered by persons in property-poor Texas school dis-
tricts did not violate the equal protection clause.76
69. See. e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972);
id. at 238-39 (White, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)
(Brenan, J., concurring); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952). See afto Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Interstate Consol. State Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207
U.S. 79, 87 (1907).
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. The Court stated:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 493.
72. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 8-15.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 37. The Court observed that the relative difference in district spending levels did
not interfere with fundamental rights: "Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its
Number 1]
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Justice Powell, writing for the majority, distinguished Rodriguez
from earlier cases involving absolute deprivation.77 Rodriguez in-
volved only a relative deprivation of rights. In contrast, the net effect
of section 21.031 is complete denial of existing educational opportuni-
ties.78 The deprivation undocumented alien children suffer is absolute
because most of the children's parents are indigent and, therefore, can-
not afford to pay a tuition;79 because many schools totally exclude un-
documented children without offering a tuition option;80 because
private schools are unable to absorb undocumented children;8' and be-
children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights
where only relative differences in spending levels are involved ...." Id.
77. Id. at 20-25. The Court reviewed prior equal protection decisions with more precisely
definable classes and absolute rather than comparative deprivations. The cases included Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (Texas candidate filing fee completely barred those unable to afford
the sum from candidacy); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (incarceration of indigents because
they cannot afford criminal fines); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (defendant's indi-
gency denied him appellate counsel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (de facto discrimination
against indigent criminal defendants unable to afford trial transcripts in order to make an appeal).
See also In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. jrls
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
78. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 458-61 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044
(1981); In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 564 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.j uris.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 580 (E.D. Tex. 1978), a}'d, 628 F.2d
448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
79. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 570 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("[t]he
evidence is quite clear that the parents of undocumented children are, for the most part, indi-
gent"),prob jurs noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). None of the named plaintiffs in Alien Children,
Post-trial Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 19, at 25, or in Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 575, were able
to afford payment of a tuition. The Plyer court, however, recognized that 2 of the estimated 40
undocumented children in the Tyler District did enroll in school on a tuition basis. Recent stud-
ies, accepted into evidence in Alien Children, indicated that the mean hourly wage for undocu-
mented workers in Texas is under $3.00 per hour. Post-trial Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 19, at
26. In 1978, the United States Civil Rights Commission observed that "[fthe situation in South
Texas for the undocumented person. . . resembles the early slavery in the United States." In re
Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. at 570. See also United States v. Ortiz, 442 U.S.
891, 900-04 app. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
80. A random sample in 1980 revealed that nearly one-half of the interviewed Texas schools
did not enroll undocumented children on a tuition basis. See note 23 supra. In the same survey
72.9% of 60 school districts indicated that they would charge a tuition or exclude all undocu-
mented children. The "total exclusion" policy ignores the fact that many undocumented children
are not deportable. In Alien Children, the court observed that
[a]ll of the named plaintiff children in this litigation.., are likewise documentable [de-
spite lacking documentation] and will probably never be deported from the United
States. They are part of the 'quarter of a million Mexicans who are currently awaiting
[for their visas] ... we are often speaking of a seven year wait.'
Post-trial Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 19, at 91.
81. Id. at 23.
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cause so-called "alternative" schools are inadequate."2
In Alien Children, the district court found that the state failed to
demonstrate that even a single undocumented child in Texas presently
attends school on a tuition-payment basis.83 Conceivably, parents of
some undocumented alien children can afford a tuition. Therefore, if
absolute deprivation is a prerequisite to the formulation of a funda-
mental interest argument, 4 only the undocumented children of indi-
gent families are so deprived. In Rodriguez, Justice Powell concluded
that if a state predicated public school admission for all children upon
a tuition payment, heightened judicial scrutiny would be appropriate.85
He recognized that the absolute denial of education to a discrete group
of indigent children would elicit far greater judicial scrutiny than the
court applied in Rodriguez. 6 Thus, according to Rodriguez, height-
ened scrutiny is the appropriate judicial standard by which to analyze
the impact of section 21.031 upon undocumented alien school children.
2. The Twin Concerns of Rodriguez Are Not Applicable Within the
Context of Section 21.031
The two major judicial concerns in Rodriguez that produced the
82. Id. at 23-24.
83. 501 F. Supp. 544, 561 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("there is no evidence of any child being admitted
to public schools in those districts which condition admission upon the receipt of tuition"), prob.
/uris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
84. See note 77 supra. The Supreme Court in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), recog-
nized that as long as the basis of discrimination is clearly defined, the exact parameters of a class
may remain unclear for equal protection purposes. See also San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 69 (1973) (White, J., concurring); id at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 544-56 (1964).
Thus, it may be true that all undocumented children, given their general predicament of pov-
erty, "constitut[e] a class sufficiently definite to invoke the protection of the Constitution." 411
U.S. at 69 (White, J., concurring).
85. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 n.60 (1973). Justice
Powell stated:
If elementary and secondary education were made available by the State only to those
able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of
"poor" people-definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum-who
would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would present a
far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us
today.
On another occasion, the Supreme Court addressed the same general issue, concluding that "a
State may not accomplish such a purpose [cost-cutting public education] by invidious distinctions
between classes of its citizens. It could not, for example, reduce expenditures for education by
barring indigent children from its schools." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
86. 411 U.S. at 25 n.60. See generally Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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Court's holding are inapplicable in the section 21.031 context. First,
Justice Powell's Rodriguez opinion stressed the Court's inability, and
thus unwillingness, to define the quality of education that the Constitu-
tion entitles each child s.8  The Court did not pretend to possess the
expertise to determine the minimal amount of education guaranteed to
each child, particularly in view of the lack of present means to measure
education in qualitative terms." The cases arising as a result of section
21.03 1, however, do not involve a claim for any subjective quantum of
education. Rather, the claimants seek an opportunity to participate in
an ongoing educational system freely available to other children. 9
Justice Powell's second concern in Rodriguez was that the Court
should not judicially legislate by intermeddling in state fiscal matters.90
Judicial deference to state fiscal discretion is the general rule rather
than the exception. 91 A court decision entitling undocumented alien
children access to public education, however, does not intrude upon
state legislative prerogative. 92 Such a decision dictates only that the
state should make educational opportunities available to all children
whose parents reside in Texas and contribute to the state school fund.
Undocumented aliens, like citizens, pay taxes that partially finance the
87. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973).
88. Id.
89. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. jurs. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044
(1981); In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 557 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.jurls.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569,580 (E.D. Tex. 1980), a9'd, 628 F.2d
448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.jurn. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
90. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31-36 (1973). See Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring), in which Justice Stewart
stated that it is not the function of the Court to" 'pick out particular human activities, characterize
them as "fundamental," and give them added protection. . . .' To the contrary, the Court sim-
ply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right. . . ." Id. See also Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76, (1980); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
91. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). The Court stated: "The broad discretion
as to classification possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has long been recognized
.... [I]n taxation, even more than other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classi-
fication." Id. at 87-88. A cost-cutting or fiscal integrity justification standing alone, however,
cannot overcome an impingement on a constitutional guarantee. "[W]hen litigants present consti-
tutional claims, (despite their novelty], the courts must endeavor to determine whether their argu-
ments are supported by the Constitution. The presumptive validity which normally attaches to
the actions of state legislatures is no cause to shirk that responsibility." In re Alien Children
Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 557 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.jur, noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
92. SeeIn re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 564 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. CL 3078 (1981).
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public school system.93
3. Nexus Argument: the Right of Access to an Education is a
Fundamental Right
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether there exists an im-
plied constitutional right of access to public education.94 In Rodriguez
Justice Powell stated that the Court should refrain from "super-legislat-
ing" by arbitrarily characterizing various human activities as funda-
mental.95 Nonetheless, the right of access to public education demands
judicial protection because it emanates from the Constitution rather
than transient social values.96 The appellees in Rodriguez maintained
that the right to some modicum of education is interwoven tightly
within the fabric of other constitutional guarantees.97 They asserted
that the nexus between education and the constitutional rights to speak,
to receive information, and to vote in state elections is so close that the
Constitution guarantees the right to a minimum level of education.98
Rather than reject this proposition, the Rodriguez Court declined to
address it.99
The Rodriguez opinion concluded that Texas equipped each child
with at least the minimum skills necessary to enjoy "the rights of
speech" and "full participation in the political process.' 'loc Though in-
dividuals are not entitled to "the most effective speech or the most in-
93. Id. at 570.
Nearly all of the recent studies which discuss the contributions of undocumented aliens
to local, state and federal tax bases strongly suggest that this group pays more into the
tax structure than they take out through social services. . . . The public school educa-
tion in Texas is financed primarily through sales taxes and ad valorem property taxes.
Undocumented aliens are unable to escape the payment of those taxes; they buy con-
sumer goods and they indirectly contribute property tax revenue through the payment of
rent.... Thus, the assertion that undocumented aliens should pay tuition to contribute
to their share of the costs of education is nonsense.
Id. at 570-71 & n.55. See generally Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affid,
628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob. jftrs, noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981); JUDICIARY REPORT OF
1977, supra note 8, at 23.
94. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327, 1331-32
(Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980).
95. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, (1973).
96. See note 105 infra.
97. 411 U.S. at 35-36.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 36. The Court concluded, "[w]e need not dispute any of these propositions." I.
100. Id. at 37.
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formed electoral choice"'' under the first amendment, complete
exclusion from an ongoing school system denies one of meaningful
speech and a minimally informed electoral choice.
The Supreme Court may deem an interest "fundamental" if it is
"preservative of" constitutionally guaranteed civil and political
rights."0 2 The important aspects of the rights to speak, receive informa-
tion, and vote are effectively eviscerated without a concomitant right of
access to public schools.' °3 The right to receive information is reduced
to a "hollow privilege" if a child is not "taught to read, assimilate, and
utilize available knowledge."'" The school is the main source of infor-
mation for a child. State denial of access to the panoply of factual data,
101. Id. at 36.
102. The Court stated in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), that:
Long ago in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 [1886], the Court referred to 'the
political franchise of voting' as a 'fundamental political right, because ofpreservation of
all rights." Recently in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 [1964], we said "Un-
doubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.
Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized ....
Id. at 667 (emphasis added). The Allen Children court interpreted this language to mean that
fundamental rights are either "preservative of' or "substantially related to" constitutionally guar-
anteed political and civil rights. 501 F. Supp. at 558.
103. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Supreme Court held
that the Constitution guarantees a right of access to criminal trials. The Court developed this right
by merging the first amendment right to receive information with the related prohibition on gov-
emment limitation of "the stock of information from which members of the public may draw."
Id. at 576. The Court (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)) con-
cluded that "without the freedom to attend [criminal trials, which people have exercised for centu-
ries,] important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated. . . .1" Id. at
580 (citations omitted). The same logic applies in regard to an argument for a right of access to
education.
104. This was the appellee's contention as advanced in San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). The argument is highly persuasive in light of the Court's
language in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969): "It is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and any other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged .. " Id. at 390 (empha-
sis added). See note 65 supra. Texas prohibits the flow of ideas to children in two ways. First,
children are denied the opportunity to hear information and ideas in school. Second, a functional
illiterate in our society lacks meaningful access to available channels of information. An illiterate
person is denied the ability to analyze and construct opinions about information he takes in from
various sources. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), took notice of the fact that
"[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon lead-
ers trained through wide exposure to [a] robust exchange of ideas. ... Id. at 603 (emphasis
added). See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 112 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 607-08, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 618 (1971); Gard, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: On Our Way to
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ideas, and experiences provided to other children in an established
school system is impermissible."°5 Moreover, the absence of formal in-
struction in the basic skills of communication and speech renders the
exercise of purposeful free speech illusory."°6 Denied the ability to pro-
cess information and to articulate beliefs, an uneducated individual is
essentially precluded from meaningful participation in the political
Where?, 8 VAL. U.L. REv 1, 16-19 (1973); Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited- Federalism, Meaningful
.4ccess, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 75, 92-93 (1980).
Education is also vital to cultural assimilation and the preservation of our societal values.
Children who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart from the larger com-
munity will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their
cultural isolation. They are likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary
from the environment in which they must ultimately function and compete, if they are to
enter and be a part of that community. This is not peculiar to race; in this setting, it can
affect any children who, as a group, are isolated by force of law from the mainstream.
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287 (1977).
105. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The Court stated that
it is essential to protect the choice to seek knowledge actively in order for individuals to exercise
their right to receive information traditionally available to the public. Otherwise, the lack of
choice would severely undermine the right to receive information. Id. at 575-76.
A related constitutional argument complements the right to receive information. The Court has
held that the "right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press
and is equally fundamental." De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). Furthermore,
"[p]eople assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but also to listen, observe,
and learn; indeed they may 'assembl[e] for any lawful purpose."' Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted). Because the public school house historically is a
freely accessible public place, the right of assembly in a public place may create the right of access
to public education. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("education is inextricably linked.. . to the rights of free speech
and association").
106. The Court stated in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), that "[t]he vigilant protection
of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
Id. at 487. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63 (1973) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); id at 112-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall noted particularly that
education is intimately tied to free speech and that education enhances enjoyment of speech
throughout one's life); Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School, 587 F.2d
1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1978) (Rodriguez suggests that a statute does not meet equal protection stan-
dards when each child is not provided the "opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills neces-
sary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process");
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 607, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 618 (1971) ("educa-
tion. . . supports each and every other value of a democratic society-participation, communica-
non... to name but a few"); Brief for Appellee at 31-32, San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) ("the meaningful exercise of [free speech]. . . is dependent upon
his ability to speak intelligently and knowledgeably") [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
The impact of denial of education upon undocumented children is magnified by the language
barrier. The end result is permanent illiteracy. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F.
Supp. 544, 561-62 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob. jurs. noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). Illiteracy renders
speech far less meaningful. See Preovolos, supra note 104, at 88.
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process. 10 7 Thus, an important theme of democracy, the expression of
varying views and ideas, breaks down without an educated populace
able to exercise its first amendment rights.108
Certain basic necessities of life, such as adequate food and decent
shelter, are not fundamental interests guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. 109 Education, however, is distinguishable from subsistence needs
in the context of a constitutional nexus argument.
First, education, unlike subsistence needs, is analogous to an impor-
tant service that constitutes a fundamental right. In Maher v. Roe t10
the Supreme Court held that indigent women are not entitled to gov-
emnment subsidized nontherapeutic abortions as a fundamental right.'
The Court stated that abortion services are unlike the fundamental
right of appellate review of criminal convictions in that the latter is a
107. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[piroviding public schools ranks at the very
apex of the function of a State .... [Slome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to
participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213, 221 (1972). For material concerning the interrelationship between education and
the right of meaningful access to the political system, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id at 112-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
SELECT SENATE COMM. ON EQUAL EDUC. OPPORTUNITY, 92D CONO., 2D SEss., THE COSTS TO
THE NATION OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 46-47 (Comm. Print 1972); Brief for Appelle, supra
note 106, at 34; Amicus Curiae Brief for the NEA at 17-20, San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief]; Preovolos, supra note
104, at 88-90; Lindquist & Wise, Developments in Education Litigation: EqualProtection, 5 J.L. &
EDUC. 1, 20-21 n.82 (1976). See generally Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: 4
Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. Rev. 305 (1969).
Recognizing that most resident undocumented aliens remain here permanently, the Alien Chil-
dren court noted that states cannot withhold the right of access to the ballot box to citizens. Be-
cause many undocumented children can eventually apply for citizenship, a lack of formal
education will effectively preclude their access to the ballot as citizens. In re Alien Children Educ.
Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 563-64 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
Furthermore, though the system denies aliens full political participation, they nonetheless may
play an important role in the political process. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
108. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court noted that
"Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a
democratic system of government." Id. at 230.
109. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (the interest in safe, decent housing is not
constitutionally mandated); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970) (despite the language
of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970), the importance of welfare benefits does not raise
them to a level of constitutional protection). See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980);
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972).
110. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
111. Id. at 474.
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"governmental monopoly in which participation is compelled."' " 2 Pri-
mary and secondary education, like the criminal justice system, how-
ever, is a government monopoly insofar as education is provided
almost exclusively by the state. "13 Furthermore, just as participation in
th(. criminal justicc Oystem is c.mp isory for penal code violators, the
state requires school attendance for all resident children except un-
documented aliens. 14 Education is a government benefit that "ranks
at the very apex of the functions of a state" and is largely unavailable
in the private sector." 5 Education should be afforded the equivalent
112. Id. at 471 n.6.
113. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
State programs providing persons welfare payments, food, and shelter are supplemental to bene-
fits freely attainable within the private sector. Education is, and historically has been, an essential
state function. The.Alien Children court stated, "[w]ith respect to a service which is provided as an
essential function of government and not by the private sector, exclusion from access to that serv-
ice will result in absolute deprivation. . . .[Denial of access to public schools] should be scruti-
nized carefully." In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 563 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
prob.juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Supreme Court recognized that although the right
to an abortion is fundamental, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the government is under no
obligation to provide funds for indigent women who seek this service. The Court recognized that
the government did not create the obstacle preventing indigent women from procuring an abor-
tion and that the "good" was available in the free market. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315-16. In
§ 21.03 1, see note 26 supra, the government is denying an existent state benefit to a class of chil-
dren financially incapable of affording either a public or private school education. Furthermore,
education emanates almost entirely from the public sector. Cost, lack of available spaces, and the
numerical shortage of schools preclude private education from serving as a viable alternative for
undocumented children.
The Court in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), noted that the criminal justice system is "a
governmental monopoly in which participation is compelled." Id. at 471 n.6. Education is also
essentially a governmental monopoly. Only a relatively minor number of children's parents can
even consider private education as an alternative.
No other governmental enterprise has so firm or complete a grip on so many people. In
no other field have the states so long and so deliberately assumed such complete, near
monopoly responsibility and required the vast majority of their citizens to participate in a
state-run enterprise. The states do not, for example, assume equivalent responsibility for
their citizens' food and housing needs. They do not compel the vast majority of citizens
to eat state food or live in public housing.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
114. Justice Powell stated in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 n.6 (1977), that participation in
the criminal justice system is compelled. Attendance in public schools is compulsory in Texas.
See Tax. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.032 (Vernon 1972).
115. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). See Foley v. Cornelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297
(1978) (public education fulfills "a most fundamental obligation of government to its constitu-
ency"). In Alien Children, the court heard testimony that "the private schools are apparently un-
able to absorb these children" because nonreligious private schools are geared for a small, wealthy
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"fundamental" status accorded to the right of access to criminal appel-
late review.
Second, Justice Powell posited in Rodriguez dictum that undernour-
ished and ill-housed persons, by virtue of their poverty, may derive
"the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment."11 6
The inability to afford food or shelter may temporarily inhibit the full
exercise of first amendment rights. Yet wealth, or lack thereof, is not
an immutable trait. 117 The poor and hungry of today are not necessar-
ily the destitute of tomorrow. By contrast, the Alien Children court
found that exclusion from school permanently precludes acquisition of
formal literacy skills.' 18 Thus, the lack of a formal education plagues
an individual throughout his entire life and denies him the skills re-
quired to exercise first amendment rights in a meaningful way.
4. Undocumented Aliens Enjoy First Amendment Rights
The label "illegal alien" is an amorphous characterization of an alien
whom the Immigration and Naturalization Service might deport if it
knew of his or her presence. 19 The lawfulness of an alien's presence
portion of the population; paraochial schools have lengthy waiting lists; and paraochial schools in
Texas are suffering financial difficulties. Post-trial Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 19, at 23.
Furthermore, Texas has recognized the importance of public education. Article VII, § 1 of the
Texas Constitution states:
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and
rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public
free schools.
TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § 1. The State Constitution of 1869 required that the state erect a uniform
system of free public schools for all children between six and eighteen, art. IX, § 1, with compul-
sory attendance, art. IX, § 5. See TEx. CONsT. ANN. art. VII, § 1 (Vernon 1876). By 1884, the
enactment of the school law firmly entrenched universal public education in Texas.
116. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). The Court
was citing Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1355,
1389-90 (1971). Schoettle argued that the ill-housed and ill-fed are not given the chance to maxi-
mize their educational opportunities. Id In recognition of this problem, the federal government
has legislated to provide indigent school children with free lunches and clothing. See note 208
infra. Economic conditions may still preclude the hungry and poorly housed children from maxi-
mizing educational opportunities; § 21.031, however, denies undocumented children in Texas any
educational opportunities.
117. 411 U.S. at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 561-62 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.
juds. noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). Also, personal poverty is not a permanent disability; one may
escape its shackles. Id.
119. See Federation for Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Tex.
1980). The court stated:
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under the Immigration and Nationality Act 2° hinges upon a deporta-
tion hearing determination rather than his or her undocumented sta-
tus.' 21  First, many undocumented aliens enjoy de facto amnesty
because federal laws mandate unenforceable entry quotas.' 22 Second,
if authorities discover an undocumented alien residing within this
country, he or she may be subject to deportation. 123 Federal immigra-
tion laws, however, entitle an apprehended alien to an adversarial ad-
ministrative hearing. 124  He or she is presumed nondeportable until a
contrary finding is made by an immigration judge.125  Because of nu-
merous defenses under the deportation statutes, many undocumented
aliens are not deportable.126 Thus, aliens residing in the United States
are entitled to the presumption of legal presence.
[T]he very concept of "illegal alien" amounts only to a vague notion of a person who
might be deported if his or her presence were known to the authorities. But the determi-
nation of that legal fact can be a complicated process, as our numerous cases involving
attempts by the INS to deport residents of this country demonstrate. The Immigration
and Nationality Act is long and complex, full of provisos and exceptions.
Id. at 573-74 n.12
120. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
122. Former Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Leonel J. Castillo
acknowledges that undocumented aliens enjoy de facto amnesty. In re Alien Children Educ. Liti-
gation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 559 n.23 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
Courts recognize that "Congress has not allocated sufficient funds to stem the tide of immigration
from Mexico. This nation has set immigration quotas which are simply disregarded. It thus is
likely that many of the undocumented persons in the country will remain here for years as a result
of government inaction." Id. at 559. President Reagan endorsed de jure amnesty for undocu-
mented aliens during his campaign. Additional legislation may be forthcoming. See notes 14-15
su~pra and accompanying text.
123. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-1326 (1976). See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 582 (E.D. Tex. 1978),
aft'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
124. An undocumented alien has a right of continued residence in this country until an immi-
gration judge determines that such person is deportable. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a), 1242 (1976); 8
C.F.R. § 36 (1981). See also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955); Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 229 (1953).
The burden of proof rests upon the government in these adversarial proceedings. See Woodby
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966). See also 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1980); note
56 supra.
125. See note 140 infra. See also 8 C.F.R. § 101 (1981).
126. A person who is technically deportable can still assert a wide variety of defenses to depor-
tation (generally based upon humanitarian grounds), including an appeal to the U.S. Attorney
General. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(c), -(h)-(i), 1251(f), 1253(h), 1254, 1259 (1976). See also United
States v. Osuna-Picos, 443 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1971) (illegal entrant permitted to stay because of
close family ties); Vitales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 443 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1971)
(alien overstaying her visa not requried to leave because of certain close ties with relatives); Lee
Fook Chuey v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 439 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1971) (same).
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Given the presumption of lawful immigration status, undocumented
alien children should receive some of the same rights the Constitution
guarantees to legal aliens. 127 Documented aliens residing in this coun-
try are entitled to first amendment rights of speech, press, religion, as-
sembly, and association.'1 8  Similarly, undocumented aliens should
enjoy some measure of protection under the first amendment. 2 9
Whether a person in the United States may exercise first amendment
rights is a question extrinsic to his or her immigration status.' 30 Polit-
ical considerations weigh heavily in the formulation of the immigration
laws,13' and thus courts should not apply them to resolve constitutional
issues; the "fights of man are not a function of immigration status."' 3 2
The Supreme Court has held that an undocumented person "do[es]
127. Documented aliens enjoy fourth amendment rights, see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891 (1975); a right of access to the courts, see Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d
220, 399 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1977); the right to work as a civil engineer, see Examining Bd. of Engi-
neers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); the right to receive state financial assistance for
higher education, see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); the right to practice law, see In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); and the right to receive welfare benefits, see Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971). See generally 1 A. MUTHARIKA, supra note 12.
Although aliens cannot vote, see Skafte v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1977), or participate in
political functions, see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978), they may indirectly participate in the political arena, see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1,
12 (1977). The Constitution explicitly affords several rights only to citizens. See, e.g., U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (eligibility for the office of president); id art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (privileges and
immunities of the states); id amend. XV, § 1 (right to vote cannot be denied or abridged by race,
color, or previous condition of servitude). Thus, the implication is that persons within our territo-
rial jurisdiction are entitled to many constitutional rights not specifically reserved to citizens.
Though the courts have recognized an ascending scale of rights to which aliens become entitled as
they obtain more indicia of citizenship, see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), undocu-
mented aliens should receive at least first amendment protection.
128. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
129. See 1 C. ANTrA{u, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.23 (1969). Professor Antieau
asserts that undocumented aliens enjoy the right to communicate (speak and receive information)
while in this country.
130. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. jurls.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
Courts may decide the extent of the liberties and freedoms enjoyed by undocumented
persons without treading on congressional control over immigration.... Congressional
power to exclude aliens does not imply state power to infringe the rights of undocu-
mented persons within this jurisdiction to receive and to exchange ideas .... [Thus],
the infringement of first amendment rights is not rendered inconsequential by the immi-
gration status of the persons affected.
Id. at 560.
131. See Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976).
132. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 559 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.pjrls.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
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not become an outlaw and lose all rights by doing an illegal act."'l3 3
Undocumented aliens, at worst, arg liable under federal misdemeanor
prosecution.13 4 Prosecution and imprisonment, however do not fully
strip one of his first amendment rights.3 5 Suspected wrongdoers, given
the presumption of innocence before proof of guilt, are not arbitrarily
denied their constitutional rights.3 6  Therefore, undocumented chil-
dren, whose parents may or may not be subject to deportation or fed-
eral prosecution at a later date, do not lose protection under the first
amendment. 3 7 Freedom from punishment in the absence of personal
guilt is a recognized right. 38 Undocumented children are powerless to
choose their place of residency and are not legally or morally culpable
for their immigration status. 139 Thus, the denial of public education is
both an inappropriate penalty for a state to impose upon innocent chil-
dren and a violation of their first amendment rights."4
B. Suspect Class Analysis
When a state law discriminates against an identifiable group consti-
tuting a "suspect class," courts apply heightened judicial scrutiny.14 1
Under strict judicial review, the state must demonstrate that the classi-
133. National Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 U.S. 423, 425 (1903).
134. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-1326 (1976). The punishment entails imprisonment up to six
months in prison and/or a fine of not more than $500. A second offense constitutes a federal
felony.
135. See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945). The court stated that, "[a] prisoner retains all rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly or by necessary implication taken from him by law." Id. See generally R. SANDERS, H.
KERPER, G. KILLINGER & J. WATKINS, PRISONERS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WITHIN THE IN-
STITUTION (1979).
136. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978).
137. The fact that officials may prosecute a child or his parents at a subsequent date should
not permit states to deny undocumented children an education.
138. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961); Wieman v. Updegratf, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
139. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d
423, 425 (5th Cir. 1974). Texas gives parents the right to physical possession of their children and
to establish their offspring's legal domicile. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 12.04(l) (Vernon Supp.
1980). Parents also have a duty to control their children. Id. § 12.04(2).
140. Although exclusion from education is not a criminal penalty, its effect upon children is
disastrous. Uneducated children from Spanish-speaking, poor families are denied any opportu-
nity to escape the shackles of poverty and ignorance. See generally Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp.
569, 577 (E.D. Tex. 1978), af, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob. juris nofed, 101 S. Ct. 2044
(1981).
141. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977);
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972);
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fication is necessary to accomplish a compelling government interest or
purpose.142 Realistically, application of strict scrutiny is fatal to the
statute. 14
3
Race is the paradigm suspect class.'" The Supreme Court, however,
has extrapolated from it two additional suspect classes: nationality1 4
and alienage.' 46  Relying heavily upon Justice Stone's rationale in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,141 the Supreme Court in Gra-
ham v. Richardson 48 declared that alienage is a suspect class.149
1. Undocumented Alien Class/fcation
To date, no court has categorized undocumented aliens as a suspect
class.'50 Three explanations account for the hesitancy of lower courts
to expand the list of suspect classes or to categorize undocumented
aliens as a subclass of legal aliens.t5 t First, a state cannot purposefully
discriminate against a suspect class.' 52 A determination that undocu-
mented aliens are suspect would prohibit a state from denying the
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-79 (1954).
142. See note 141 supra.
143. See generally Gunther, supra note 64.
144. See Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260 (1979); McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954).
145. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954).
146. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 601 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
649 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F.2d 577,
579 (3d Cir. 1972).
147. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Justice Stone stated that, "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 153 n.4 (dictum).
148. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The Court declared that, "classifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny
.... [Alliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority. . . for whom
. . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." Id. at 372.
149. Id.
150. See generally In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
prob.juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E. D. Tex. 1978), aft'd,
628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
151. See also Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448,457 n.25 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.uris. noted, 101 S. Ct.
2044 (1980).
152. See notes 141-43 supra and accompanying text. The state, however, need only change the
parameters of the class.
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group the state's bounty in all contexts. Second, recent Supreme Court
decisions indicate an unwillingness to find new suspect classifica-
tions.153 In particular, the Court has refused to elevate illegitimacy and
gender to suspect status.'54 Third, in Ambach v. Norwick'" and Foley
v. Connelie 156 the Supreme Court carved a "governing functions" ex-
ception out of the suspect class of alienage. 5 7 These decisions illustrate
the Court's disinclination to use alienage as a blanket suspect classifica-
tion.' Thus, the confluence of these three factors suggests that the
Supreme Court will not find that undocumented aliens constitute a sus-
pect class.
Nonetheless, undocumented aliens are more deserving than legal
aliens of suspect classification and heightened judicial protection from
the majoritarian political process. 59 Undocumented aliens are a "dis-
crete and insular minority" and meet the traditional indicia of suspect-
ness--disability, history of purposeful unequal treatment, and political
impotence-enumerated in Rodriguez.6°
The long history of invidious economic, social, and legal exploitation
153. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Although the claimants did not have standing
to assert an equal protection claim, the Court's preemption analysis supports a conclusion that
undocumented aliens are not a suspect class. The Court, using equal protection terminology,
concluded that the statute prohibiting employment of undocumented aliens protected "vital state
interests" and was "tailored to combat effectively the perceived evils." Id. at 357. See generally
Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption on Equal Protection, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1069,
1081 (1979).
For cases refusing to extend suspect classification, see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)
(illegitimacy); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age). See gener-
all' Levin, The Courts, Congress, and Educational Adequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament,
39 MD'. L. REV. 187, 226 (1979).
154. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)
(illegitimacy). In both instances, a majority of the Court failed to characterize the classes as sus-
pect. See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
For cases denying or determining admission to school based upon gender, see Berkelman v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974); Kirstin v. Rectors & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
155. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
156. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
157. See 441 U.S. at 75; 435 U.S. at 295. But see 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1092 (1977).
158. See generally Note, supra note 153.
159. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11 (1977).
160. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court de-
picted a suspect class as a class "saddled with such disabilities .... subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, [and] relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command... [special judicial solicitude]." Id. at 28.
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of undocumented persons, particularly in Texas, continues today.161
Undocumented immigrants "are exploitable and more vulnerable than
any other group in the United States."' 162 Undocumented aliens are
also politically powerless. They cannot vote and must rely upon other
groups to seek redress for their plight in the political process. 63 Un-
documented aliens attract little political representation, as evidenced
by the failure of Congress to remedy their exploitation. 164 Further-
more, the fear of deportation precludes most undocumented aliens
from asserting their legal rights in a judicial forum. 6 -
Despite the fact that documented aliens can attain citizenship and
divest themselves of suspect status, they are entitled to heightened judi-
cial protection until they attain citizenship.' 66 Similarly, courts should
afford children of undocumented aliens suspect status until they too
become citizens. Undocumented status is a characteristic that most
school-aged children cannot control.' 67 Undocumented aliens' chil-
dren are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to stigmatization be-
cause they cannot rely upon their parents to protect their rights. Thus,
heightened judicial scrutiny should extend at least to the discrete and
insular class of school-aged undocumented children.
2. Ind'gency Classfication
Supreme Court decisions require fulfillment of three criteria before
the Court will strike down de facto wealth discrimination. First, a
clearly defined class is necessary. 168 Second, the class must face abso-
lute deprivation of access to a state benefit that is not within the "area
of economics or social welfare."' 169 Third, de facto wealth discrimina-
tion must impinge upon a fundamental interest or involve a suspect
161. See notes 2-10 supra. See also Post-trial Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 19, at 42-44.
162. Post-trial Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 19, at 43 (statement of Leonel Castillo, former
INS Commissioner).
163. Id. at 44.
164. See notes 2-4 spra. In 1977 and 1979 committees failed to report out bills that would
have granted a fair number of undocumented aliens total or partial amnesty.
165. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),
prob.tris,. noted, 101 S. CL 2044 (1981).
166. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.ll (1977).
167. See notes 116-18 supra.
168. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19, 22, 25 (1973); In re
Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. jurls. noted 101 S.
Ct. 3078 (1981).




class. 170 Although the Rodriguez claimants failed to meet these re-
quirements, the section 21.031 discrimination fulfills all three.
In Rodriguez, Justice Powell indicated that the appellees failed to
demonstrate that the Texas school finance scheme disadvantaged "any
definable category of 'poor' people."' 17' The class of undocumented
children that section 21.031 excludes from public school is definable in
"terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum."'172 Thus, the law
discriminates against a distinct class of disadvantaged undocumented
children on the basis of their indigency.
Undocumented alien families' poverty and lack of alternative educa-
tional sources absolutely deny the children access to an education.
173
Moreover, education is distinguishable from other public services by its
widely recognized importance, the monopolistic character of public
education, and the fact that the state compels public school attend-
ance.'74 Most public benefits supplement goods and services that are
readily accessible in the private sector. Education, by contrast, is a
service available almost exclusively from the public sector. 175
Finally, wealth classifications alone are not suspect. 176 As recog-
nized by Justice Marshall, poverty per se does not necessarily render a
discrete and insular minority group politically powerless. 177 Nor does
wealth discrimination entail the onerous social stigma associated with
racial discrimination. 17  Furthermore, poverty is not necessarily a per-
manent disability.179 Consequently, Supreme Court decisions invali-
dating discrimination against indigents concern statutory infringements
upon constitutional rights.' In Harper v. Virginia Board of Educa-
170. See notes 109-16 supra.
171. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973).
172. Id. at 25 n.60.
173. See notes 66-67 supra. But see McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802,
807 (1969) (dictum) (wealth and race are "factors which would independently render a classifica-
ton highly suspect"). See generally Levin, supra note 153, at 198 n.53.
174. See notes 109-17 supra.
175. See note 113 supra.
176. See generalo San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
177. Id. at 121-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec., 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (indigents incarcerated because of their inability to pay); Wil-
liams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (same).
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lion' 8 the Court concluded that the right to vote is denied to indigents
if a state imposes a poll tax upon voters.'82 Similarly, if an indigent
cannot pay for trial transcripts or hire an appellate attorney, the crimi-
nal appeals process is unconstitutionally inaccessible.18 3 The Texas de-
cision to exclude undocumented children from public schools denies
the access to education that should extend to all children in this coun-
try.'84 If access to education is a fundamental right, section 21.031
must be invalid on wealth discrimination grounds.
3. Nationality Classfcation
Section 21.031 arguably discriminates against a class of aliens by na-
tionality. Nationality constitutes a suspect class."8 5 Although the stat-
ute denies all undocumented alien children a formal education, the
law, in practice, has an impact almost exclusively on undocumented
Mexican children." 6 In Tayyari v. New Mexico State University s7 a
district court reviewed a university policy denying admission to citizens
of nations holding American citizens hostage.'88 The court struck
down the policy, holding that the university based the classification
upon national origin, although the school's policy did not single out
any specific nationality.18 9 Similarly, a court may reasonably infer that
section 21.031 discriminates against a national group: Mexicans.
181. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
182. Id. at 668.
183. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
184. See notes 91-118 supra and accompanying text.
185. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring). But see Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973),
in which. Justice Rehnquist stated:
The state statute that classifies aliens on the basis of country or origin is much more
likely to classify on the basis of race, and thus conflict with the core purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause, than a statute that. . . merely distinguishes between alienage as such
and citizenship as such.
Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For cases involving Hispanic discrimination and education,
see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'dinparl, 445 F.2d 990 (10th
Cir. 1970), aft'd, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
186. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448,451 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.jurs. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044
(1981). The court noted, "Mexican nationals are not the sole target of Section 21.031, which
includes all aliens whose presence in the United States is not legal. The vast majority of the
excluded class, however, are Mexican nationals. Id.
187. 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1373.
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A state statute or school policy having a negative impact on an ethnic
or national group constitutes an invidious and constitutionally imper-
missible classification when the claimant can prove discriminatory in-
tent or purpose. 190 The claimant need not show, however, that
discrimination against a discrete group is the sole or dominant purpose
of the policy. 191 Courts may infer discriminatory purpose after a
review of the magnitude of disproportionate impact and other relevant
historical data.192 The inference is particularly strong if the legislature
could readily foresee the disparate impact of the statute at the time of
enactment. 193 If a discriminatory purpose is shown, the defendant
must prove that absent the alleged intentional discrimination, the same
result would have occurred. 194
Until 1975, section 21.031 entitled both Mexican-American and
Mexican residents of Texas to public education. 195 The record of in-
vidious discrimination by the State of Texas and its schools against res-
ident Mexican-Americans and Mexicans within the field of public
education, however, 196 suggests that section 21.031 is but another ex-
ample of discriminatory conduct. After reviewing the previous exten-
sive practice of segregating Mexican-Americans in inferior "Mexican
schools," a district court in United States v. Texas 197 concluded that the
extent of educational discrimination in 1981 rivaled the magnitude of
state supported segregation and discrimination existing in Texas in
1971.198 Consequently, the court held that Texas had subjected Mexi-
can-Americans to de jure discrimination in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 99
190. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,413 (1977); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971).
191. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977).
192. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
193. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979).
194. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 n.17 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
195. See notes 20-21 supra.
196. See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 411-12 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
197. 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
198. Id. at 411. See also United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aft'd, 447
F2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971).
199. See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. at 413. See also United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 600 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Because proof of intentional past discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin by school systems may raise the inference of impermissi-
ble conduct,20° Texas' historical discrimination against Mexicans in its
educational system implies that section 21.031 may incorporate a dis-
criminatory purpose. Furthermore, the complete denial of education to
a distinct class is arguably more odious than a dual school system pred-
icated upon segregation of races. The only court that has addressed
this issue, however, held that section 21.031 classifies on the basis of
immigration status rather than nationality.201 The Alien Children court
reached this conclusion because section 21.031 does not discriminate
against all Mexican nationals residing in Texas.20 2
C. Middle Tier Scrutiny
Courts examine illegitimacy and gender classifications with an inter-
mediate or "middle tier" standard of review.20 3 The test imposes upon
the government the burden to show that the classification is substan-
tially related to an important governmental objective. 204  Thus, the
statutory classification must not be arbitrary and must rest upon a dis-
tinction substantially and fairly related to the purpose of the legislation.
Furthermore, the statute should treat similarly situated persons
alike.205
200. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973).
201. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 573-74 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.
,rs, noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
202. Id.
203. Cases in which the Court applied the middle tier test for gender-based discrimination
include Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76
(1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1978); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); and Weinberger v. Wien-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). See also Hughes, Equal Protection and Due Process Contrasting
Methods ofReview Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 529, 541-
45 (1979); Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 160, 162-72.
Cases in which the Court applied the middle tier test for illegitimacy-based discrimination in-
clude Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); and Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
204. The test, as stated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), is whether the classification
"serve[s] important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 197.





Although the Doe v. Plyler2° decisions professed application of the
lower, rational relation tier of equal protection scrutiny to invalidate
section 21.031, they in fact applied a "middle tier" level of analysis. 20 7
Furthermore, the concurring opinion in Boe v. Wright recognized that
section 21.031 is permissible under rational relation scrutiny.208
If access to education is not a fundamental right and undocumented
aliens are not members of a suspect class, intermediate tier judicial
scrutiny is appropriate. This level of scrutiny is particularly applicable
in instances involving discrimination against what Professor Tribe re-
fers to as a "sensitive," but not suspect, class. 20 9 Section 21.031 classi-
fies against a "sensitive" class because it penalizes children who are
undocumented aliens. The vulnerability of these children to discrimi-
nation is magnified considerably by virtue of their undocumented alien
status. The combination of the "sensitive" class of undocumented alien
children with the important interest of education creates a strong case
for middle tier scrutiny.210
The Supreme Court has recognized that it is unfair to penalize or
stigmatize children who are not responsible for the circumstances of
their birth.21' Undocumented alien children have no control over their
birth in Mexico, their parents' residency decision, or their parents' vio-
lation of the Immigration and Nationality Act.212  Recognizing that
"legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibil-
206. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980); 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
207. The Fifth Circuit and the district court both acknowledged that strict scrutiny could have
been the appropriate review, but concluded that they need not resolve the question because the
defendants advanced no rational basis for the discrimination. In only one case has the Court used
a traditional rational relation test to overturn a state statute. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66
(1957), oyerruled, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam). See generally
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
208. In Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1981), Circuit Judge Reavely, concurring, cor-
rectly observed that a discriminatory legislative classification is presumably constitutional under a
rational relation analysis. Id at 434 (Reavely, J., concurring). See City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). Under the rational basis test, the equal protection clause is
violated only if the classification is wholly irrelevant to the state's objective. See, e.g., McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
209. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1090 (1978). Professor Tribe recognizes that
gender and illegitimacy, though not suspect classes, are "sensitive" classes.
210. Id.
211. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); Glona v. American Guar.
& Liab. Ins., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
212. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 573 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.
juris, noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 582 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd,
628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.juri. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
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ity or wrongdoing," 213 the Fifth Circuit, in St. Ann v. Palsi,214 struck
down a child's suspension from school that resulted from his mother's
misconduct in striking an assistant principal.215 Similarly, numerous
Supreme Court decisions have applied a middle tier test to invalidate
state statutes that draw lines on the basis of illegitimacy.2 16 Illegitimate
children, like undocumented children, are not culpable for their par-
ents' wrongs. To stigmatize and penalize undocumented children by
barring them from the education system "is an ineffectual-as well as
an unjust-way of deterring the parent."'217
Texas contended in the Doe v. Ply/er decisions and in Alien Children
that the exclusion of an identifiable group of children would save the
state money and improve the quality of education for all other stu-
dents.21 8 To accomplish this end, Texas employed the most drastic
available means: total exclusion of undocumented children from the
schools.
2 19
If fiscal integrity alone could justify all statutory classifications,
courts would be powerless to invalidate many discriminatory stat-
utes.220 Additional justifications for the classification are necessary. In
Alien Children, the court found that Texas failed to substantiate its ad-
ditional justification, the impact of the exclusion of undocumented chil-
dren upon the quality of education. 221 The state offered no evidence
demonstrating that admission of an estimated 120,000 undocumented
children would have a grave impact upon the quality of education.222
The admission of these children might result in a slight diminution of
per-pupil expenditures.22 3 Rodriguez, however, held that the quality of
education is not directly correlated to the amount of money expended
213. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
214. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974).
215. Id.
216. See note 206 supra.
217. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
218. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp, 544, 574 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.jurls.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). The argument, that providing education to undocumented children
induces illegal entries, is an impermissible purpose. Measures designed to have a direct impact
upon immigration are preempted. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
219. 501 F. Supp. at 583.
220. See note 91 supra.
221. 501 F. Supp. at 583.





on each pupil.224 Furthermore, despite its healthy economy and net
operating surplus, Texas ranks only forty-second nationally in per-pu-
pil expenditures.225 Rather than exclude a group of children from its
schools, Texas can appropriate additional money to improve the quali-
ty of education.
The Alien Children court found that Texas failed to show "that the
classification actually advances the state interest. '226 The classification,
in fact, is merely an engraftment of federal immigration criteria and
fails to treat similarly situated persons alike.227 Section 21.031 is un-
derinclusive in that undocumented Mexican children are indistinguish-
able from documented Mexican and Mexican-American children in
terms of their educational needs and characteristics. Both groups of
children are generally in need of bilingual education, free meals, and
free clothing programs provided through state and federal funding.228
Further, section 21.031 is overinclusive in that undocumented par-
ents, like other parents, finance public education.229 Public school edu-
cation in Texas is funded predominantly through sales taxes and ad
valorem property taxes.230 Undocumented alien parents necessarily
must pay those taxes when they buy consumer goods and pay rent.231
It is nonsensical to assert that tax-paying poor families should contrib-
ute their "fair share" of the costs of education by payment of a tui-
tion.232 The courts have recognized that such an assertion is similarly
unsuited to undocumented families. 233
Thus, section 21.031 is not substantially related to the government's
interest in providing children with a quality education. The means em-
224. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 n.56, 42-43 & n.86, 46
n.101 (1973).
225. 501 F. Supp. at 580.
226. Id. at 583.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 583 n.104. The federal government is the largest contributor to these programs.
Federal funds are not prohibited for the education of undocumented children. In fact, such chil-
dren are included in the government counts used to allocate funds for the states. See Doe v.
Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 589 n.28 (E.D. Tex. 1978), ajf'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.fjirlr.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
229. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
230. 501 F. Supp. at 583. See also note 74 supra and accompanying text.
231. See note 93 supra and accompanying text. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 38
(many long-term undocumented aliens "contribute to their school systems through various forms
of local taxation").
232. See notes 85-86 supra.
233. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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ployed by Texas, in fact, are not effective in achieving the desired end.
The distinction drawn between undocumented children and docu-
mented or citizen children is not fairly or substantially related to the
objective of improving the quality of education.
III. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
Federal law preempts state legislation, under the supremacy
clause,2 4 if it encroaches upon an area of federal responsibility or con-
cern. The preemption doctrine involves a two-part inquiry. First,
under the "occupation" wing, state enactments are invalid if federal
legislation evinces congressional intent to occupy the field.235 Thus, if
Congress expressly ordains an intention to occupy a field or "the nature
of the. . . subject matter permits no other conclusion," state authority
is "ousted." 6 Second, state legislation is invalid if it is in conflict with,
or serves as an effective obstacle to, the achievement of federal pur-
poses or objectives. 237
Recent Supreme Court decisions narrowed the broad scope once ex-
tended to the federal preemption doctrine."3 De Canas v. Bica239 in-
volved a California statute criminally penalizing employers who hire
undocumented aliens. Although Congress possesses the exclusive
power to regulate immigration,240 the Court held that the state statute
was valid because Congress did not unmistakably manifest an intent to
occupy the field of employment of aliens and the statute was not an
obstacle to the achievement of any congressional purpose.241 Thus, the
Court determined that the state restriction did not entail regulation of
federal immigration matters or impinge upon federal objectives.
Applying the De Canas rationale, both the Fifth Circuit and the
234. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
235. See Catz & Lenard, Federal Pre-emption and the 'Right" of Undocumented,41en Children
to a Public Education: A PartialRepl,, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 909, 912-13 (1979); Note, The
Preemption Doctrine Shiting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L.
Rav. 623, 626, 646-49 (1975).
236. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,356 (1976) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
237. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
238. See, ag., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974); Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Gold-
stein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
239. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
240. Id. at 355, 364.
241. Id. at 355-56.
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Southern District of Texas found that section 21.031 is not invalid
under the supremacy clause. 242 Title I of the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act of 1965,243 the Immigration and Naturalization
Act,2' and the Articles of the United Nations Charter and the Charter
of the Organization of American States245 do not preempt section
21.03 1.246 Therefore, neither national nor international law preempts
section 21.03 1.
242. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 1978),prob. furis. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044
(1981); In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 584-88 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.
Juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). But see Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 590-92 (E.D. Tex.
1978), a17'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob..yurif noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
243. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (Supp. III 1979). Though undocumented children are counted in
the Title I migrant "formula" to determine the federal funds allotted to Texas, theAllen Children
court concluded that some children are "formula eligible," but do not benefit from the federal
funds. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 587 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob. jutris.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). Further, although Title I is silent on the matter, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that Congress failed expressly to include undocumented children in the program. Doe
v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 453-54 (5th Cir. 1980),prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981). Because
Texas can comply with the federal statutes despite § 21.031, the Alien Children court concluded
that there is no specific conflict between the state and federal programs. 501 F.-Supp. at 587.
Moreover, Title I is not a mandatory act; it is merely a funding provision. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d
at 453. Thus, even if § 21.031 disqualifies Texas' participation in Title I, the federal statute does
not require free public education grants for undocumented aliens. Id. See also New York State
Dept. of Social Servs. v. Publino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). But see Rogers v. Brockette, 558 F.2d 1057
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1980).
244. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976). The Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) does not
preempt § 21.031. Section 21.031 is not an exercise of exclusive federal power or state legislation
in an area occupied by Congress to the exclusion of the states. In re Alien Children Educ. Litiga-
tion, 501 F. Supp. 544, 588 n.1 18 (S.D. Tex. 1980),prob.iurr. noted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). The
INA is mainly concerned with the "terms and conditions of admission to the country and the
subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country." De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359
(1976) (emphasis added). Both employment of and education for undocumented aliens are con-
cerns peripheral to the INA.
245. See Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, arts. 31, 47, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847
(amending Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S.
No. 2361); U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56. Though the two international agreements state that each
member nation shall promote education, they fail to preempt § 21.031 because the charters are
neither self-executing nor indicative of a clear commitment to educating undocumented children
within each nation. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 453-54 (5th Cir. 1980),probjudrs. noted, 101 S.
Ct. 2044 (1981). Article 47 of the Organization of American States Charter stresses that partici-
pants are to promote education within the constitutional limits of each country: "The Member
States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance with their constitutional processes, to insure
... the right to education." See also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Oyama v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring).
246. See notes 242-45 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Rodriguez specifically leaves
open the question of whether access to public education is a fundamen-
tal right guaranteed by the Constitution. The answer to the question is
clear. The nexus between education and numerous first amendment
rights is so close that denial of public education amounts to a denial of
the right of speech, the right to receive information, and the right to
participate in the political process. Furthermore, a child's immigration
status does not bear upon the applicability of first amendment rights.
The first amendment should afford undocumented alien children resid-
ing within our country many of the same rights documented alien resi-
dents enjoy.
Undocumented aliens warrant suspect class status even more than
legal aliens. Economic and legal exploitation of undocumented aliens
far exceeds deprivations suffered by documented aliens under the
majoritarian political process. Section 21.031 may also impermissibly
discriminate against undocumented alien children by wealth or nation-
ality. In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, however, it is un-
likely that the Court will analyze section 21.031 discrimination on
suspect class grounds.
If the Supreme Court refuses to classify access to public education as
a fundamental right, the Court should apply a middle tier equal protec-
tion test. Although the state interest in providing children with a quali-
ty education is important, Texas cannot demonstrate that exclusion of
undocumented children serves this end. The state has available more
appropriate means to insure quality education for children residing
within the state.
Undocumented aliens' problems are not peculiar to border states.
They affect the entire nation. Congress, following the strategy of the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, is now devel-
oping comprehensive legislative alternatives. As more Mexicans and
people of other nationalities enter this country, legally and illegally, the
demands upon many public programs will increase dramatically. The
impact, particularly on education, will continue to be great. Respon-
sive federal assistance analogous to the Refugee Education Assistance
Act of 1980 is necessary to alleviate the impact of growing concentra-





Undocumented aliens that reside in this country must provide their
children with an education to assist them in becoming productive
adults. Many of these children, who constitute only a small percentage
of the overall undocumented population, will become legal residents,
particularly if Congress accepts President Reagan's proposals. The ra-
tionale behind denying such children an education is simply
unfounded.
The height of the irony underlying section 21.031 is exemplified by
Mexican families that have entered this country surreptitiously with a
child born in Mexico. Children born in these families after entry into
the United States are American citizens. Section 21.031 would deny
public school admission to one child in the family, yet entitle the other
child to free public education by virtue of the fortuitous location of his
or her birth.
The policy of excluding a class of children from school produces illit-
erate, unassimilated, and unproductive adults. Denial of education to
undocumented alien children will damage the long-term interests of
Texas. Justice Powell perceptively recognized that denial of education
traps these children indefinitely within the poorest and most exploited
class in our country. He predicted that this condition will force many
of these uneducated children into a life of crime or dependency upon
public assistance.24 7 Although the Texas legislature designed section
21.031 to save money, it may produce a future net loss by denying the
state the benefits of potentially productive adults.
Craig Heberton IV
247. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327, 1332-33
(Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980).
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
Ihttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/5
